Russian Military Problems - By now, it's no secret: Russian troops are facing logistical problems in Ukraine - from a convoy being stopped outside Kyiv to reports of Russian troops raiding grocery stores for food. Experts debate whether the problem is due to pollution, poor planning or both.
Over the decades, the Russian military began to professionalize its police structure, relying more on contract soldiers rather than conscripts. In comparison, the United States ended conscription and became an all-volunteer police force in the 1970s.
Russian Military Problems
Source: d.newsweek.com
However, unlike Russia, the United States. The military quickly ended conscription and spent significant resources building (and evaluating) an elaborate system of programs designed to recruit, train, support and retain a highly professional workforce. Although Russia's efforts to professionalize have been somewhat slow, there is some evidence that their military scholars are looking to the United States for insight.
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Providing fuel and ammunition to a modern military is always a major challenge, especially when embarking on deep offensive operations that stretch supply lines. The US Army also had to take an operational hiatus during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 due to logistics and truck shortages.
The Russian army is no exception. While Russian forces face serious logistical challenges, armies have overcome such difficulties in the past and are unlikely to be fatal to an attack. The latest standoff in Kharkiv is one of many consequences of Russian command failures.
They still happen, because the only thing to learn from these events is to acknowledge that they happened. While Russian nationalist sources and even senior commanders are increasingly questioning the way the conflict will be contested, these concerns are unlikely to turn into learning opportunities without Moscow's consent.
Failure Of Leadership
The 82% force commitment collected does not mean that President Vladimir Putin is "spent", the official added. "On the contrary, it continues to add to its options" and "is not at the extreme in terms of available combat capabilities."
The Russian military is also struggling to coordinate the different components of its forces - ground and air, for example - and make them work together properly. In contrast, the Ukrainian side was more flexible, showing the ability to react quickly where necessary.
Source: sites.breakingmedia.com
"Since 2014 Ukraine has had serious problems with modernization due to its economic problems, so the army has modern air defenses and artillery, especially anti-battery artillery radar and other surveillance equipment that has some chance of detecting and at least stopping artillery
the enemy. They have their own," Reynolds told CNN. . Russian material is generally surprisingly well designed and adequately built. To take a specific example, the Orlan-10, the main drone flown by the Russian forces, is cheap and easy to operate.
Fear Of Failure
sophisticated, but can fly high enough to be targeted by short range air defenses and has a long range.-The use of ranged air defenses is too cheap to justify its use, and is designed to be completely
awkward to destroy, providing its operators with an adequate view of the battlefield to identify targets However, these strengths do not compensate for the significant shortcomings of the Russian military To begin with, organization: The Russian military is small, high
- Intensity Designed to fight fierce battles. Without a full national mobilization, it is too small, its units lack the logistical capacity, and its equipment is inadequate for a long war. When the Russian military issued orders to its troops in the fall of 2021, it estimated the need for them to be deployed for nine months.
Now that limit is being reached. The Ukrainians, in contrast, have been organizing their army for this exact type of war since 2014. The success of the Kharkiv resistance was rooted in the deception of Russian intelligence, which caused them to redeploy their forces at a critical moment
. There is talk that Russia will withdraw to establish a new front line, although there is doubt about their ability to coordinate their limited forces into a meaningful deterrent. One aspect of deep mechanical operations that receives less attention than logistics is management.
Armored vehicles break - a lot. Although there are more at the regimental or brigade level, Russian battalion tactical groups have on average only one light vehicle and one heavy recovery vehicle, a combined arms formation of up to a thousand soldiers.
Source: www.brookings.edu
This is not a problem during short range operations. Combat formations have organic capabilities to create effective area security around their battlefield footprints. Recovery vehicles can pick up broken equipment quickly with fewer escorts because a friendly force is always nearby.
Short tow distances allow recovery vehicles to make multiple turns in a short time, something Russian forces can do with a small number of battalion-level recovery vehicles. If Russia takes the capital soon, it will be difficult for Ukraine to fight back.
But if that fails, the dispute could become lengthy. And that's a scenario where Ukraine's decision could be a powerful tool, Mitchell said. The Russian military also benefits from its facilities. The Russians have an efficient rail network that facilitates the movement of combat equipment.
They have many factories to produce weapons, companies directly involved in government control, and access to much needed raw materials. Where the West has pursued efficiency at the expense of durability, the Russians still have high efficiency in their production lines.
This is less true for precision weapons, as Russia does not have a sophisticated microelectronics industry and therefore has to import critical components. Under Putin is Russia's military infrastructure, much of which is directly related to the invasion of Ukraine.
The initial invasion was massive, involving no less than four of Russia's military district headquarters. It introduced a lot of bureaucracy and slowed down the decision-making process. An effective military requires people and equipment, but also a strategy to guide what those people do with that equipment.
Enough has been written about people and equipment, but we believe that the current war in Ukraine points to some of the hidden problems in the Russian military personnel and personnel system. We cannot speak to Russia's military strategy or the equipment they use.
However, we can suggest what Russian service members do with their devices. The failures seen among the Russian rank and file suggest that this country has fundamental problems in its efforts to professionalize its police structure.
Source: media.newyorker.com
But you don't have to take our word for it, the Russian military and their officers have released research - sometimes with data - to support this conclusion. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy leads Ukrainian forces and those forces have "displaced their assets well," the US official said, adding that "the will to fight is very strong" among Ukrainians.
Security aid from the United States and other countries also continues to flow to Ukraine, and Ukrainian officials have indicated that they are taking advantage of it. Even in 2022, the modern Russian military is still struggling to overcome the rigid command structures and top-down decision making of its Soviet legacy.
Although the ability of field commanders to make quick decisions is also questionable, the fear of failure does not allow for risk or experimentation on the battlefield. To be clear, this is not just a Russian problem.
This is common to all armies in the world. But this is a very painful problem for the Russians at the moment. In the north and south, the Russian army carried out deep penetration attacks up to 120 miles.
Initially, no forces were left behind to secure the line of communication. This meant that broken vehicles were abandoned or combat vehicles had to be diverted to remove them. Based on multiple images emerging online, Russian commanders decided to abandon their vehicles after a certain point.
The crew initially stayed with them, but as resistance emerged the Russian army stopped the crew from leaving for fear they would be captured or killed. A control problem also delays operations but does not stop them.
Major vehicle losses are damaging but not catastrophic. Russian factories were away from the fighting and could make up for Russian losses; Ukraine's main combat vehicle factory is located in Kharkiv, where heavy fighting is currently ongoing and parts of the factory have already been destroyed.
Once the new railheads are established, the Russian forces will have the opportunity to transport new vehicles by rail and revitalize their fighting forces. They are also likely to recover some of their abandoned vehicles as the National Guard continues to establish area security throughout the occupied territories.
Source: cdn.images.express.co.uk
The official said the Ukrainian resistance was "very efficient and creative," and that Russia was still having trouble supplying fuel and food to its forces, but it was unclear whether those problems stemmed from poor planning or execution.
bad, or both. "We believe they have moral issues that led to effective operational success" north of Kyiv, the official said. The official previously pointed to signs of Russia's reluctance to "take high risks with their own aircraft and their own pilots" as a factor in the slow progress elsewhere in Ukraine.
Russia lost many of its senior officers to enemy fire. Most junior officers do not have the authority to make decisions without supervision or confidence, so senior commanders must maintain a direct presence on the battlefield to provide direction and inspiration.
In the United States military, the Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps steps up to make sure everything goes smoothly. But the Gen said. David Petraeus, former commander of US forces in Afghanistan, told CNN last week that Russia's new NCO corps is nearly underdeveloped.
So rather than a disciplined and deliberate reverse-RSOI, Russian troops are likely to throw away, burn, or sell most of what's left. Russia's offensive against Ukraine has been slower than many Western analysts expected. In some areas, Russian forces advanced as much as 120 miles in the first two days before collapsing.
Elsewhere, especially around Kharkiv, the Russian attack immediately failed. Some of the delays were the result of successful Ukrainian resistance, particularly around Kharkiv, while others were the result of logistical challenges faced by the Russian military;
Some US officials have suggested that logistics is a "definite vulnerability" for Russia. This seriously hampers efforts to move and produce new units. Ukraine struggles with training because, unlike Russia, its facilities are under missile attack - hence the importance of training in the UK - but the training provided is much better.
today, Russia's army in Ukraine has not stopped because of its problems. Once the captured railroads are implemented, the Russian military is likely to overcome its transportation and maintenance challenges. A new railhead is available in Kherson in support of the drive against Одеса.
Source: sites.breakingmedia.com
In the north of Dnipro, another railhead will be established somewhere. Kyiv operation only takes a long time, because the railway lines that go to that place go through Chernihiv and Nizhny, Russian armed forces have to be cleared before the battle for Kyiv begins.
After the new railheads are established, it reduces pressure on Russian truck-borne logistics by reducing supply lines. Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses of the country's military system, however, is training. First, it just doesn't do enough.
For example, at the beginning of the war, there were less than 100 fully trained Russian pilots in Ukraine, even though Russia had deployed at least 317 fighter jets to the theater. So when Russian troops arrived in Belarus at the end of January, they only got days instead of weeks to conduct RSOI and went directly to exercises with Belarus - where they used up most of their supplies.
Then they waited... and they waited. finally they said they would leave. For packing, a purposeful process separates usable materials from those that cannot be used in their standard operating procedure, and carefully noting where they are packed.
But during this time, they were traveling, living in tents, eating military rations and dealing with cold temperatures for weeks. வார்கு சியுக்கு, அலைக்கியியுக்கிட்டு, வியு கார்க்குக்குக்க்குக்குக்கு However, many of Russia's challenges are now on display, but have been simply hidden for years.
Although some of these problems existed during previous Russian military operations, the fierce resistance of the Ukrainians, as evident from the reports of several Russian generals killed in Ukraine, is exposing them more clearly than during past conflicts.
மாட்ட்டுல் கோக்கு கிர்கியிகியியுக்கு மாட்டை Many generals' death, senior officials may talk about the need to direct field operations in person, is a potential sign of a lack of trust in the chain of command. "It's about 60 warring groups, including. The situation is developing rapidly and that number may change, but it's very big and it's important. It's the biggest thing we've seen in Eastern Europe in many years - in my lifetime," Mitchell told CNN. For example, in 2014, Russian
More than a quarter of their own personnel surveyed by the military's sociology center reported problems with their infantry equipment. A 2020 article in the Ministry of Defense Military Journal talks about a gap in the deployment of advanced systems and the ability of service members to operate them effectively. Eastern Military District Commander
Gennady Zaytko ((PDF) heavily involved in the conflict) bemoaned the shortage of officers at battalion and regimental level in 2020. The Russian invasion of Ukraine appears to have gone without a hitch. The internet is flooded with reports of Russian soldiers stranded in convoys, deserting their units and unable to maintain their equipment.
not. Russia's effort to collect and confirm examples of abandoned, destroyed and captured military installations was forced to end due to the inability of its aides to keep up the pace. other departments showed signs of confusion and CNA Russia expert and ex-CIA military analyst Jeffrey Edmonds insider described as "operational errors", follow-on support or military convoys sent without air-raid operations to surprise attacks.
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